

[Ainsworth must remain willing, ready to carry out SIOB-62, if ordered. But if they keep that willingness

What has not been investigated in CF?

of the ~~the~~ the What has been left undone?

Will we ever go back to SIOB-62?

What is the future of SIOB-62?

Analyze factors that led to it: (Many of them would be reproduced in other countries: SU, UK, France...?)

Notes: good for integration, problems that NATO and national forces will present (TOT coord? Do other nations care as much about interference?)

In Feb 63, Eisenhower BNSP revealed; Services told that ^{etc,} speeches would be basis

"ISA, JCS versions of BNSP were turned down by the Sec Def. messaging process... 4th revision of Rostow's version

"We don't have a Bible... but we do have a policy."

"We should candidly sell" to Allies... the relative disadvantages of tactical nuclear... — where BNSP?

Distinguish ²⁾ White House attitude, speeches

b) OSD attitude on plans

c) Comptroller, DDRE on

" Areas of disagreement :

1) That initiation of strategic warfare is not acceptable. ^{under any circumstances.} [Note Guidance for S/O P-64]

2) That conventional aggression must be met with conventional weapons.

"Since there is no BNSP, we have adopted this statement from many sources..."

Has the term

~~BNSP~~ "mutual deterrence" been used in any of the drafts of the BNSP? It did occur in most of the BNSP's.

"US rejects first-strike forces."

"Any possibility of accidental...etc explosion must be eliminated."

"The use of ~~to~~ too many weapons would probably escalate to all-out GW." (If

[When

Col. D

"As I read the policy, we are trying

"Space is for peace" — not part of national security policy.

Children: "One could make a case that

1. Air Force could be said "objectively" — in terms of its ^{intell. estimates} decisions, etc. —
to be in favor of minimum deterrence, (or preventive war?) — and Navy
in favor of controlled response (Polaris) & ~~some~~ CF (intell. estimates).

But: a) I wouldn't brief Power formally, saying: "As I understand
it, the Air Force policy for the future is pure city-busting
("alternative undertakings", SIOB, int. est.)." (attached on CD).

b) It is important to know the opponent objectively: the constraints
he sees, his expectations, his view of possibilities & practical objectives,
not just his "wishes."

[e.g. McN's probable wish to have a capability such
that he could announce "no first use" if he wanted without
~~the~~ national security or alliances suffering (I'm not sure he
would want to announce this even if he could): may be of interest,
but it is also important to ask, "Does he think he can do so now,
or next year? Does he see the costs? Is he willing to pay them?"

No; yes; No. so — the problem is not what it would be
if answers to these were different.]

[Staff ^{Craig; Kent} ~~the~~ men who operate effectively in the joint arena
know these real positions of their opponents, not just this parade
on a caricature. But Air Staff seems really not to know
OSO: not just pretending not to know, for tactical reasons.
Hence, miss opportunities, fight phantoms, don't fight real battles
effectively.]

Could point out to USAF what their ^{decisions} ~~positions~~ of 1958-61 were
supporting among future policies, what future policies they were making
out. But shouldn't imply: a) conspiracy; b) "unconscious motives."

To imply conspiracy, to dismiss statements of objectives, is to imply that: 1) Admin. actions and "real policies" (which reflect not just preferences but perceptions of cost, risk, possibilities, responses, other goals) are consistent; so that 2) No one talking to them at all — except to

persuade them to change their objectives, even their preferences (e.g. their goals are "impossible"; they "really are" X although they say Y; ...)

Actually, there is leverage to apply to OSO [also with White House]: they really do share many goals, perceptions with USAF: 1) Could be made to see that actions, ^{affecting future} are inconsistent, premature, risky, etc; 2) ^{they would} ~~not~~ likely accept USAF proposals along certain lines.

2. What are McN's real force goals in non-nuclear area?

a) MC 26/4. b) US forces enough in Europe; or too much.

c) Cold flow: likely to see some pullback (don't leap to misconstrue; alternative explanations possible, don't posture on the worst immediately; ask, find out...

d) US forces in 21 enough (?). So... ~~How threatening is this~~

Equipment, mobility, support: last two are (potentially) USAF money, not Army or Navy: though not SAC money.

Not 175 divs. Not "whatever it takes to outmatch SU"

(²Rowen: "If it took 90 divs in Europe...").

How threatening is this to USAF? Increase in force size is essentially accomplished. Package I money may go down: but USAF money need not.

3. ~~But~~ Whereas the Admin, in effect, only one major problem — to which SAC (not USAF as whole) was the solution — this Admin does see other problems. Hence, SAC does have to compete for funds within a larger but perhaps not growing budget.

No longer overwhelmingly predominant claim on budget; other problems regarded as comparably urgent. Not just change in Admin; change in SU ^{and in Europe} (less threatening w.r.t. surprise attack, more ^{less threatening in conventional} threatening on 2d strike, very threatening in "tac" ^{war in Europe, capability,} war in Europe, capability,

4. ~~But~~ SAC optimism natural, at sound of "controlled response"; but: (a) Rejection of the specific proposals, RS-70, Midas, Skybolt, 1000 new MM, does not imply "rejection of CF" — "minimum deterrence position" — given cost, performance, availability date, substitutes rise of budget already, alternative strat. systems, and other uses for the money.

~~But~~ Put on USAF officer who recognized other problems and these changes in NSC position: would he make other choices?

[RS-70 hardest case: but most expensive; others...]

→ 4. OSD policy on force requirements for CF: Rumsfeld, Trinkle
Is this a threat?

b) USAF enthusiasm on above projects (+ cost increases in MM, etc.)

probably has soured MCN on Ann Arbor-type speeches: and USAF.

(and me?)

(also, Alliance reaction). Note ~~initial~~ initial NSC reaction

to my BNSP — now, they think they were stung.

[USAF: if you're for that, you must buy...]

[5. vs. Bottomly: 1) "Sacrifice defense" and you sacrifice "credible first strike"; 2) first strike capability will not be enough to deter pressures, crises; and won't keep crises from shattering alliances & promoting hostility

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6. Promote first-strike threat, capability, as part of deterrence/response posture, not as all [esp with limited budget: if budget gets really limited, it is first-strike cap. in this admin that is more likely to suffer]: i.e. emphasize it is complementary to CN forces, not as total substitute (doing some job) — this admin prefers the other, if it has to choose.

7. Tactics can encourage effort to pin an "extremist" label on an opponent: 1) in argument with him, try to get him to bend in your direction, get commitments; 2) in enlisting support against him (Pres, Congress).

McN tried this (with some basis: "anyone who wants what these things achieve, at this cost "really wants..."): memo to Pres

Nowy vord to try it... (8 "Preventive war"...

USAF is trying it... (vs. Taylor, OSD... ^{note}).

OSD is not extremist: but label-pinning can drive it toward more extreme Admin. positions; Service support could reduce prob of this. (Page image of OSD vs. State in Cuban crisis).

If support in Congress were working well for USAF, then go ahead.

But if you want McN to back your proposals:

1) Drop accusations of "extreme" positions,

2) Refer to, explicit, endorse contrary indications, OSD emphasis on flex, range of alternatives, etc.; show inconsistency ^{of actions} with proposed goals,

3) intra-off accusing OSD of hidden, extreme goals.

Don't pretend that RS-70, Skybolt, etc. are basically inconsistent.

3) Make a private effort — and let it show, where approp —
a) to see whole range of problems, pressures, ^(WH, ...) McN sees ;
b) and to see the worldwide strategic context realistically of allies,
SU);

c) get a realistic feel of what McN wants, now; and why
(why not more, less, other). (e.g. what others in Admin want: get feel
of how tactics affect power & positions within). See "threats" realistically.

00 ~~(d)~~ Analyze how USAF (not just SAC) could
contribute to whole range, in some perspective.

(e) See real SU; and real effectiveness of USAF systems.



f) Talk realistically about ways to fight wars (e.g. Cambodia), including
non-nuclear wars; less use of words like "impossible," etc.

Children 4. For "current strategic thinking" see: ISA/BNSP, sent to
CINCs. Show various views. JSCP-64. NSTAP.

(No war in Lebanon; Cuba; Thailand.... ^{USMC are deterrent})

— USAF "no war" policy. (way to deter little wars, is to
have effective way of fighting which US or US/allies are willing to use).

See the effects of the "USAF-prepared Soviet enemy"



The deterrent effectiveness of our military forces will depend upon their ability to respond successfully to thermonuclear war emergency in any of its foreseeable forms. This will require, among other things, that the highest national authority be capable of selecting ^a response ~~the~~ ^{that} which will provide the United States and its Allies the maximum possible advantage in the specific circumstances under which deterrence may fail. It is my belief that the ability to select from among a wide range of feasible response options suited to specific circumstances could permit the United States and its Allies to ~~survive~~ ^{achieve their wartime objectives} in thermonuclear war, in a position enabling resumed progress toward their common ^{future} objectives, with casualties and damage reduced significantly below levels which might otherwise be expected.

It is my intention to encourage and support plans and programs which will in the future provide a posture affording such a wide latitude of response options, ^{acceptable} ~~capable~~ of selection and control for maximum advantage. Concurrently with improvements in our posture, it should be possible to reflect in basic policies and war plans, to the degree made feasible by progress toward the requisite capabilities, provisions for increased latitude in options for selective response to thermonuclear war emergency.

I am, therefore, also interested in prospects for the shorter term time period. The currently effective Single Integrated Operational Plan for strategic attack (SIOP-62) ^{permits} ~~provides~~ a variety of options/contingencies for response by forces committed to strategic offensive tasks, keyed principally to duration of warning, geographic discretion, constraints, and specifics of weather and visibility. Similar latitude is ~~provided~~ in other atomic war plans.

It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff cause the Director of Strategic Target Planning to scrutinize the current SIOP-62 and forces committed to its execution, and that other appropriate Commanders-in-Chief similarly scrutinize their current plans.

scrutiny will be to provide answers to me on the following:

- a. To what specific extent might it be feasible in the near term 1961-1962 time period to provide a wider latitude of options for response to thermonuclear war emergency, assuming that any impediments to this action embodied in the current National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy were removed?
- b. If such additional options are deemed feasible, and desirable, what would be the prudent and realistic time schedule for their earliest integration into current plans?
- c. If such additional options would depend upon changes in capabilities, would any such changes be feasible of accomplishment at reasonable cost and effort in the near term, and what specific actions would be necessary?
- d. What capabilities presently ^{not} lacking ^{programmed} would be the principal requirements for a future posture permitting a wide variety of response options calculated to derive maximum advantage from any of the reasonably foreseeable circumstances under which deterrence to central war might fail?
- e. Are there any other major problems or difficulties foreseen, in light of the recognized necessity to avoid any disruption in the continuity of our current war ^(maintenance of current) plans and capabilities, which could weaken the overall deterrent posture?

Of specific interest would be assessment of the possibilities affecting the early development of options which might permit avoidance of attacks against enemy urban-industrial and population resources as such in initial attacks; options which would permit exclusion from initial attack, to the extent feasible, of one or more member nations of the Sino-Soviet bloc without the necessity for replanning the balance of the attack; options which would relieve selected elements of ready forces

from initial attack assignments to permit their retention as uncommitted ready reserves for possible subsequent use; options providing varying degrees of adjustment, beyond those currently planned, in force posture during periods of critical tension; and so forth.

Response by 15 June 1961 will be appreciated.